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NOTE
AWARDING ATTORNEY AND EXPERT WITNESS
FEES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
In the United States the successful litigant in a civil action generally must pay for his own lawyer and expert witnesses.' The legal
feeS2 of the winner are not included in the costs, which are normally
taxed against the loser.3 There are, however, both statutory and judicial exceptions to the general rule,4 some of which become significant
in environmental litigation. Statutes that specifically authorize awards
I This is true for reasonable attorney fees in both federal and state courts. See 6
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcncE
54.71[2], at 1703-04 & n.2 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE]. As for expert witness fees, the general rule applies in federal courts. See note 3
infra. Some states, however, specifically allow taxation of the winner's expert witness fees
and expenses as costs. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666 (1968).
2 This Note refers to reasonable attorney and expert witness fees collectively as "legal
fees" and "litigation expenses." In the context of environmental litigation, the arguments
favoring the award of both types of fees are similar.
3 In federal courts costs are "allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs." FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d). In state courts, the same rule generally
applies. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 8101 (McKinney 1963).
Costs are the administrative expenses produced by the litigation, payable by law as part
of the judgment to the court and several of its officers. Items taxable as costs in federal
courts include various fees for court clerks, reporters, witnesses, copying, and printing.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970). The maximum allowances for any witness--expert or ordinary
-includible as statutory costs are set forth by statute. See id. § 1821. The portion of the
expert witness fee in excess of these statutory amounts is not spedfically defined as includible in costs. A nominal attorney's docket fee (usually $20) may also be included in
statutory costs for payment directly to the winner's attorney. See id. §§ 1920(5), 1923. Although this docket fee is actually an attorney fee, it is only a fraction of the real expenses
incurred by the winner for his legal representation. In state courts, a correspondingly inadequate substitute for a reasonable attorney fee is often provided. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8710 (1953) (minimal amounts ranging up to $13.33 for specified legal
services); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 261, § 23 (1968) (maximum counsel fee of $2.50). See also
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-257 (Supp. 1973) (prevailing party receives "by way of indemnity" $75, with additional allowance in "difficult or extraordinary cases" of $200).
4 See notes 35-143 and accompanying text infra. One major exception arising outside
the environmental field involves the situation in which the parties to a contract or lease,
as part of their transaction, agree on the allocation of costs, including legal fees, prior to
any litigation that may arise. See McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New
Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAm L. REv. 761, 769-70 (1972). Two other
special situations in which the courts have traditionally awarded attorney fees are a
wife's action for divorce or separation and cases in which the plaintiff sues to recover his
attorney's fees incurred in prior litigation that was necessitated by the wrongdoing of the
defendant in the present action. See, e.g., Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp.
814, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1966); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 1037,
at 225-26 (1964).
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of reasonable attorney and possibly expert witness fees can be mandatory5 or discretionary, and always deal with particular areas of litigation such as consumer protection, civil rights, or air pollution.7 The
judicial (or equitable) exceptions to the general rule are the product
of the courts' power to fashion a just remedy and embody general
principles that apply to widely diverse situations. Although some commentators have urged the abolition of the general rule,8 the modem
judicial approach has been to broaden the application of the equitable
exceptions, forging new concepts when necessary to deal with new
problems. Court-awarded legal fees are of crucial importance today
in the fight to save our environment because no other feasible method
exists for ensuring citizen vigilance and public-interest litigation. 9
I
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

A.

Causes of Action

"Environmental litigation" describes a multitude of actions
brought to protect ecological and environmental interests. 10 These

5

E.g., Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Truth in Lending Act, § 130(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970);
Consumer Product Safety Act, § 24, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2073 (Supp. 1973). Several of these
statutes only require an award of fees to the plaintiff, while others require the award to
the prevailing party. For a more extensive listing, see MooRE
54 .71[2].
6 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. I,
§ 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). A court's decision to allocate litigation expenses
under a discretionary statute may involve such factors as the losing party's bad faith, the
need for deterrence, the value of private enforcement of strong public policies embodied
in the statute, and possibly the relative economic status of the parties. See notes 35-39
and accompanying text infra. These discretionary factors are similar to those that are applicable when a court exercises its equitable powers to award legal fees in the absence of
specific statutory authority. Courts have described the criteria for ascertaining appropriate
fees for attorneys and expert witnesses. See, e.g., In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1931). See also MOORE 54.77[2], at 1715-16; 7A C. WRIcrr &cA. MIL ER, FEDERAL PRACTHcE
AND PROCEDURE § 1803, at 289-92 (1972). This Note does not discuss these latter criteria, but
instead focuses on the factors that should persuade a court initially to exercise its discretion in allowing legal fees as costs.
7 See notes 5-6 supra and note 35 infra.
8 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA
L. REv. 75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38
U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967).
9 See text accompanying notes 31-39 infra.
10 One author has divided environmental litigation into three categories: (1) suits in
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actions may be founded upon the common law, statutory provisions,2
1
or constitutional claims. Tort theories, such as private or public'
14
1
3
nuisance, trespass, and negligence,' as well as strict liability for ultrahazardous activity 5 and products liability, 16 may be successfully employed. Inverse condemnation actions, 17 based on the fifth amendment,
allege an unconstitutional taking, and a constitutional right to a clean
environment has been claimed as a "penumbral" right of the fifth,
ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amendments.' 8 An older yet still compelling theory is based on the public trust doctrine. 19 Actions premised
which the government is the protector, either as plaintiff or defendant, (2) suits between
private parties, and (3) private suits against the government. See Moorman, A Brief Look
at Environmental Causes of Action, 18 PRAc. LAw. 81, 81-86 (1972). This Note examines
cases that fall within the last two categories, especially the public-interest suit against
governmental officials and large-scale private polluters.
11 See, e.g., McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966)
(punitive as well as actual damages awarded).
12 An action for public nuisance by a private citizen requires that the plaintiff have
suffered damages qualitatively different from those suffered by the general public, and
further requires that the responsible public officials have refused to prosecute the offender.
See, e.g., Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 109 N.W.2d 749 (1961).
13 See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964).
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
16 See, e.g., Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960). See generally
Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 32 (1970).
17 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
18 See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MC2: Environment Equals
Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CoaNFLL L. REv. 674 (1970); Sive, The
Environment-Is It Protected by the Bill of Rights?, Civil Liberties, April 1970, at 3,
col. 1. Whether § 101(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42
U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970)) recognizes an individual's right to a clean environment has been
much debated, especially in light of the changed wording which the congressional conference committee inserted into the version of NEPA first passed by the Senate. Originally,
the pertinent language provided that "Congress recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(b) (1969). In presenting the compromise, and adopted, version which noted that
"each person should enjoy a healthful environment" (§ 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970)),
Senator Henry Jackson stated:
I opposed this change in conference committee because it is my belief that
the language of the Senate passed bill reaffirmed what is already the law of this
land; namely, that every person does have a fundamental and an inalienable right
to a healthful environment. If this is not the law of this land, if an individual in
this great country of ours cannot at the present time protect his right and the
right of his family to a healthful environment, then it is my view that some
fundamental changes are in order.
115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969).
19 See Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment,
1970 UTAH L. REv. 388; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L Rav. 471 (1970). For a discussion of the possible use
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on the federal antitrust laws20 and qui tam statutory provisions21 can
also be used to further environmental aims.
Private citizen suits, as authorized by the newer federal environmental laws, 22 may become the most effective weapons in the environmentalist's arsenal of statutory causes of action. Under this new legislation, a private individual with standing, irrespective of the amount
in controversy or citizenship of the parties,m may bring a civil action
in a federal district court against violators of standards or abatement orders issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).24
Further, these laws allow suits against the EPA Administrator or other
responsible federal officials for failure to perform nondiscretionary
duties. 25 Some state legislation goes even further. For example, Michigan's broadly worded environmental protection act 26 allows a person
to sue anyone, including the state and its agencies, "for the protection
of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction."2 7
B. Financing Public-Interest Environmental Litigation
The arguments favoring court-awarded legal fees in environmental
cases are strongest when the action is pursued in the public interest and
of this theory in conjunction with the equitable fund exception for awards of fees, see
notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra.
20 See, e.g., In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
21 See note 33 infra.
22 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365 (Supp. 1973); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g),
33 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g) (Supp. 1973); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 304, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1857h-2 (Supp. 1973); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911 (Supp. 1973).
23 In describing the prerequisites for institution of a citizen suit, the Water, Sanctuaries, and Air Acts (see note 22 supra) expressly dispense with the amount-in-controversy
and citizenship requirements, but the Noise Act only expressly dispenses with the
amount-in-controversy prerequisite. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911(a) (Supp. 1973).
24 See note 22 supra.
25 Id. It is important to appreciate the somewhat limited scope of the actions Congress

has authorized by these citizen suit provisions. The citizen may only seek specific relief
against polluters and federal officials. The citizen suit cannot be a free-wheeling attack,
but must confine its aims to those of the governing act-compliance with antipollution
standards and fulfillment of nondiscretionary duties outlined in the act. These citizen

suit provisions, however, put no restriction on the citizen's independent pursuit of his
otherwise existing statutory or common law rights of action. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1365(e),
1415(g)(5) (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857h-2(e), 4911(e) (Supp. 1973).
26 Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Supp.
1973).
27 Id. at § 14.528(202)(1).
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not for personal gain.28 The sine qua non of public-interest environmental litigation is that it seeks to advance a conservation goal on behalf of the general public. Public-interest environmental litigants usually seek specific relief such as declaratory judgment, injunction, or
mandamus. The reasons for this are twofold. First, individual damages
are difficult to measure and apportion in a large-scale pollution action
brought on behalf of the public. 29 Second, federal class actions for
damages present jurisdictional problems which can be obviated only
if the numerous class members jointly seek specific relief for their
common grievance.80 These remedies, however, cannot produce a
money judgment out of which attorneys and expert witnesses can be
paid. The public will surely benefit from an injunction, but it is only
the richest of environmentalists and the most dedicated of groups
who would, or could, bear the economic brunt of protracted litigation.
Thus, the remedies which are most appropriate in public environmental litigation have a dampening effect on the private litigant's
enthusiasm for bringing a lawsuit.
Nevertheless, citizen participation in the legal and administrative
battle to save the environment is widely acknowledged as desirable and
even essential.8 1 Neither the class action 2 nor the qui tam reward3 3
28 "Private-injury" environmentalists can be distinguished from "public-interest" environmentalists. Both types of litigants have environmental interests at stake, but the
private-injury plaintiff pursues only his personal, proprietary interests, which are usually
protected by the traditional tort actions for trespass, nuisance, and negligence. The "bad
faith" equitable exception to the general rule against the award of expenses does have
application even in a case strictly limited to private compensation for individual environmental injury (see notes 59-60 and accompanying text infra), but the public benefit inherent in the public-interest suit is the crux of the equitable fund and private attorney
general exceptions as applied to environmental cases. See notes 92-99 & 143-48 and accompanying text infra.
29 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1782, at 113. The concept of largescale environmental destruction suggests an injury suffered by the public as a whole and
not an injury severable into a myriad of small claims. Moreover, environmental injury to
an individual may be nearly impossible to assess in realistic economic terms.
80 See note 32 infra.
81 In his August 1971, "Message to the Congress," President Nixon stated:
In the final analysis, the foundation on which environmental progress rests
in our society is a responsible and informed citizenry. My confidence that our
Nation will meet its environmental problems in the years ahead is based in large
measure on my faith in the continued vigilance of American public opinion and
in the continued vitality of citizen efforts to protect and improve the environment.
The National Environmental Policy Act has given a new dimension to
citizen participation and citizen rights-as is evidenced by the numerous court
actions through which individuals and groups have made their voices heard.
7 W xaa= Comp. oF PREs. Doe. 1132, 1133 (1971).
The President's executive agency charged with monitoring the success of the country's
battle against environmental destruction stated in its Second Annual Report:

1973]

ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION FEES

1227

is as effective in encouraging private involvement in environmental
litigation as court-awarded legal fees. Without court-awarded fees for
Perhaps the most striking recent legal development has been the step-up in
citizen "public interest" litigation to halt degradation of the environment. In the
face of a history of administrative decisions that ignored environmental impacts
and against a tide of legislative delays in developing pollution control law,
citizens concluded that they must use the courts to cure the neglect. The citizen
litigation has not only challenged specific government and private actions which
were environmentally undesirable. It has speeded court definition of what is
required of Federal agencies under environmental protection statutes. The suits
have forced greater sensitivity in both government and industry to environmental
considerations. And they have educated lawmakers and the public to the need
for new environmental legislation.
U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALry, ENviRoNMENTAL QuALrry: SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT 155-56 (1971).
32 Class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 have been touted as the
ideal weapon for vindicating the rights of numerous "small claim" plaintiffs. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968). A Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(3) class
action can produce a monetary fund from which the attorney's contingent fee can be paid.
Such a suit for damages, however, is an unvieldy instrument for affecting social policy,
primarily because Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and its progeny have held that
each member of the class in a diversity action must meet the federal jurisdictional prerequisite amount of $10,000. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033
(2d Cir. 1972) (applying Snyder requirement to unnamed as well as named members of
class); Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974 (9th
Cir. 1969) (applying Snyder to federal question situation). Moreover, the Rule 23(b)(2) class
action for declaratory or injunctive relief is naturally adapted to "achieving purposeful
social goals or vindicating important individual rights." AAMRICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWvYERs, SPECIAL COMIrArME ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULEs OF CIvIL PROCEDURE, RE-

PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (1972); see 7A C. WmRGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1782,
at 113. In the pre-1966 terminology of Rule 23, such (b) (2) actions are "true" class actions
because the class members have "a common and undivided interest" in the environment.
See Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916). Therefore, under a Rule 23(b)(2) action small
claims of injury can be aggregated to meet the $10,000 minimum jurisdictional amount,
thus avoiding the Snyder dilemma. However, since the Rule 23(b)(2) action does not result
in a money judgment, attorneys will be unwilling and unable to undertake the financial
burden of public-interest litigation unless some method of compensation is available. The
equitable award of legal fees, in the absence of more specific statutory authority, provides
the perfect complement to a Rule 23(b)(2) environmental class action. See AmERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERs, supra at 29. Without this incentive for attorneys, the class action
offers no solution to the problem of financing public-interest environmental litigation.
33 The Refuse Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970)), provides a qui tam reward. This
provision has been mentioned as a possible means of encouraging private watchdog
actions against water polluters. See J. BRECHER & M. NEsTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 228 (1971). In a qui tam action, the informer brings a civil action to collect his
prescribed portion of a fine assessable against a violator of the criminal statute authorizing
the suit. The Refuse Act prescribes criminal penalties of up to $2,500 for violations of its
rather strict pollution control requirements (33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1970)), specifies that
an informer should get one-half of the fine (id. § 411), but is silent on the informer's right
to institute a qui tam action to recover his reward. The authorities are split on whether
the informer has such an implied right of action. Compare United States ex reL. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 & n.4 (1943), with Comsn-rm ON GOv'T Ops., 91Sr CONG., 2D Ss.,
Qui TAM AcrnoNs AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAwsUITs AGAINsT POLLUTERs OF
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the private citizen litigating in the public interest, the call for indvidual
citizen participation becomes hollow. 4
II
ENVIRONMENTAL

STATUTES ALLOWING FEES

Recently, Congress has enacted environmental statutes which explicitly arm the courts with the discretion to award reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees in suits brought by private citizens as authorized by the statutes.8 5 Although the scope of these citizen suits is rather
narrow, 6 the very existence of such provisions for court-awarded fees
is indicative of Congress's recognition of the necessity for citizen partici7
pation in this area.3
The statutes provide no guidelines to aid a court in reaching its
discretionary decision to award fees. Faced with such a decision, a
court will undoubtedly consider certain equitable factors which have
been developed as a basic common law backdrop to the entire question
NATION'S WATERWAYS 22-23 (Comm. Print. 1970). The qui tam action, therefore, presents special legal complexities and is limited to water pollution suits. Consequently, the
qui tam provision has been of little value elsewhere in the war on pollution. See generally
TH

Kafin & Needleman, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to Protect the Environment, 17 N.Y.L.

FORUM 130 (1971). Although the qui tam reward is not an improbable tactic for legislatures
to use in encouraging citizen vigilance, the concept is largely an anachronism. Under the
newer federal environmental laws, Congress has instead pursued the more direct and
flexible approach of allowing reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to citizens suing
in the public interest. The award of such legal fees is not tied to any prerequisite that a
criminal fine be involved.
34 See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
85 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365(d) (Supp. 1973); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g)
(4), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. 1973); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 304(d), 42
U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2(d) (Supp. 1973); Noise Control Act, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911(d)
(Supp. 1973).
36 See note 25 supra.
87 The legislative history of the first of these citizen suit provisions for legal fees

provides some insight into congressional motivation. The Senate report on the fees provision emphasized the public service that a private action by an individual litigant would
provide:
The Committee has added a key element in providing that the courts may award
costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever the court determines that such action is in the public interest. ...
The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this
section citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the
courts should award costs of litigation to such party.
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). The drafters intentionally gave the courts
authority to award fees to either party in an attempt to discourage bad faith suits but
yet allow reimbursement to citizens litigating in good faith. Id.
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of allocating the costs of litigation. First and most important, the
citizen's suit implements a strong public policy favoring protection of
the environment. Since encouragement of such suits will usually be to
the public's benefit, there is inherent value in shifting the expense of
such litigation to those who flout that policy.8s Second, an award of
fees against a private polluter must necessarily have a deterrent effect
on other violators of the environmental laws. The presence of the
ubiquitous private citizen with power to initiate enforcement proceedings sua sponte should generate a healthy respect for the law and
the public's right to a decent environment. Third, the private polluter
who callously disregards the public's environmental interests is guilty
of bad faith and should pay the costs of the litigatiorr necessitated by
that disregard for the law and the public.8 9 Fourth, when public officials
are subject to constant examination in the performance of their nondiscretionary duties, government is likely to be more responsive to
public needs. Finally, the relative economic positions of the parties
must always be at least a tacit consideration in allocating costs. The
polluting corporate giant or the government-each with its own staff
of attorneys and experts-would be practically immune from suit
by a concerned citizen with vastly more limited resources were it not
for the equalizing effect of the fee-shifting device. These same equitable
factors have compelled the courts to create certain well-defined exceptions that permit fee-shifting even in the absence of specific statutory
fee provisions.
III
EQUITABLE EXCEPIONS

The power of a court to award the expenses of litigation not
normally taxable as costs-including reasonable attorney and expert
38 The value of the public-interest suit is recognized by many of the federal statutes
that allow awards of legal fees as costs. In Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50
F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass 1943), the court described the rationale underlying the mandatory fee-shifting provision in § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b) (1970)):
The government has set up a regulatory system for the benefit of persons in the
plaintiff's class. To make the regulation effective private suits as well as public
prosecutions are permitted. Suits by plaintiffs, if well founded, are in the public

interest. Therefore, the cost of prosecuting successful suits should be borne not
by those who were victims but by those who have violated the regulations and
caused the damage.
89 An analogous view is that the particular violator is punished if made to pay costs
which include the plaintiff's legal fees. This view is by no means unfounded. See, e.g.,
Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38
U. Cm. L. Rav. 316, 818 & n.14 (1971). The more positive view of costs, however, is that
they generally are designed to allocate the inevitable expenses fairly between the litigants.
See generally notes 44-58 & 94 and accompanying text infra.
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witness fees-is an integral part of the court's equitable power.40
Because taxation of costs is a procedural matter, this equitable power
arguably extends to all civil actions. 41 Normally, a court will award
fees to the successful litigant 42 "only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice." 48 Under this inherent power the courts have
developed two major exceptions to the general rule against the award
of expenses: the "bad faith" and the "equitable fund" doctrines. Recently, the "private attorney general" exception has also evolved. Its
complete judicial acceptance may prove vital in fostering public-interest
environmental litigation.
A.

Bad Faith Exception

Whenever a party knowingly attempts to avoid his clear legal
duties or to harass his adversary without justification, the court may
penalize such bad faith by shifting the innocent party's legal expenses
to the recalcitrant or harassing adversary. 44 Either the plaintiff or the
defendant can be guilty of bad faith and thus be assessed legal fees
under this doctrine. In essence, the court views the dispute as entirely
unnecessary, the guilty party's bad faith having created the need for
the litigation.
In civil rights and school desegregation cases, the courts have
40 The language of the Supreme Court in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939), leaves no doubt that both attorney and expert witness fees were involved in the
Court's discussion of the source of the equitable power to award litigation expenses. The
Court was considering "the power of federal courts in equity suits to allow counsel fees
and other expenses entailed by the litigation not included in the ordinary taxable costs
recognized by statute." Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that "[p]lainly the foundation for the historic practice of
granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable
costs is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation." Id. at 166 (footnote omitted).
41 The merger of law and equity in federal and state courts unified the formerly
bifurcated rules of procedure. Although a court's power to award actual litigation expenses as costs derives from equity, this power exists today under a procedure which
applies uniformly to all civil actions, whether sounding in law or in equity. See, e.g.,
MooRE
54.77[2], at 1712 & n.21. Thus, in environmental litigation, the equitable doctrines favoring awards of attorney and expert witness fees apply to suits in equity for
declaratory and injunctive relief and possibly to legal actions for mandamus or damages.
42 An equitable award of fees may be granted at an interim stage in the litigation
(see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)), or even if the plaintiff is only
partially successful. See Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 455 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972) (fees allowed to "losing" plaintiff union that sought to prevent merger of segregated local unions
pending institution of protective transitional measures on theory that plaintiff advanced aims of Civil Rights Act of 1964). The action need not be prosecuted to judgment
before fees may be awarded because this would discourage proper settlements. See Levine
v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107
(2d Cir. 1964).
43 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939).
44 See generally Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928),
rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
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awarded litigation expenses to plaintiffs who have successfully established a violation of their constitutional rights. When a labor union
refused to bargain for its black members, thus forcing them to resort
to expensive litigation in defense of their rights, the court held that
such "discriminatory and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor
organization" justified an award of counsel fees under the bad faith
exception. 45 In desegregation cases, bad faith has been found in the
conduct of school officials who have resisted compliance with clear
judicial directives to dismantle their dual school systems. Thus, in
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners,46 school authorities resubmitted a
"free-transfer" plan that the Supreme Court had already flatly rejected
as constitutionally impermissible.47 The Sixth Circuit held that the
school board's "unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy"4 8 warranted courtawarded legal fees for the successful plaintiffs. 49 It is important to
emphasize, however, that the bad faith exception can operate against
a defendant only if the defendant acts in flagrant violation of clearly
established duties."0
When a party must institute civil contempt proceedings to preserve
and enforce his adjudicated rights, the court may award the deprived
party his litigation expenses as part of costs because of the "willfulness
inherent in the contemptuous act."'ri Although the legal fees in such
52
cases are usually recovered in equity as costs, the court in bad faith
cases may deem the award of such fees an integral part of damages.53
45 Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951). See generally
Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974, 984-88 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
46 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1972).
47 See Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
48 453 F.2d at 263.
49 See also Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12, 16 (8th Cir. 1968); Bradley v. School Bd.,
345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1963); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
50 In Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 39 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1972), the district court's award of litigation expenses under the bad faith
exception was based on a finding that "the School Board was clearly in default of its

constitutional duty." The court of appeals reversed on the facts, finding that the plans
for implementing unitary schools to overcome de facto segregation involved unresolved
issues such as busing and redistricting, as to which the defendant's duties were unclear
in many respects. 472 F.2d at 327. The circuit court also rejected the lower court's use
of the private attorney general doctrine as an alternative basis for an equitable award
of fees. See note 111 infra.
51 In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 1955). Similarly,
in cases of fraud, "if the court finds after a proper hearing that fraud has been practiced
upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled, the entire cost of the proceedings could justly be assessed against the guilty parties." Universal Oil Prods. Co. v.
Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 823 (1946) (dictum).
52 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
53 In an admiralty case, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), the Supreme Court
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The bad faith exception can apply equally against a plaintiff. The
plaintiff who institutes a groundless, wanton, or malicious lawsuit primarily designed to harass or oppress his adversary may also be guilty
of bad faith. 4 In Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,55 the court described the
stockholder's suit for injunction as "without any basis" and brought for
"vexatious and oppressive" reasons. Although the court deemed it
inappropriate for the plaintiff to pay all of the defendant's $5,000 in
legal expenses incurred on what the court called the plaintiff's "fishing
expedition," the court held that the plaintiff "should at least pay for
the bait, which is fixed at $2,000."15
The bad faith doctrine is woven into the fee provisions of the
newer federal environmental laws and should discourage frivolous
citizen suits while simultaneously encouraging good faith actions
against polluters and erring government officials. 57 In cases where no
statutory award of legal fees is available, the doctrine will come into
play only when the "innocent" party's right (plaintiff) or freedom from
liability (defendant) is virtually unquestioned and the "guilty" party's
allowed the libellant, who sought maintenance and cure, to recover fees as a part of

compensatory damages. It observed:
[R]espondents were callous in their attitude, making no investigation of libellant's
claim and by their silence neither admitting nor denying it. As a result of that
recalcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what
was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old. The default was willful
and persistent. It is difficult to imagine a dearer case of damages suffered for
failure to pay maintenance than this one.
Id. at 580-81 (footnote omitted).
54 See, e.g., In re Swartz, 130 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1942) ("groundless and unwarranted claims causing expense to an estate').
This component of the bad faith doctrine is so well recognized that some states have
standing procedural rules on the subject. One such rule provides:
In an action or part of an action, if the court finds that any proceeding
was had (1) in bad faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3)for purposes
of delay the court shall require the moving party to pay to the adverse party
the amount of the costs thereof and the reasonable expenses incurred by the
adverse party in opposing such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
-MD. Cr. App. (Civ.) R. 604(b) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide certain sanctions-orders to
pay the opposing party's litigation expenses-against conduct which amounts to bad
faith and causes unnecessary expense. The Federal Rules are by no means as sweeping as
the bad faith exception, but rather are aimed at specific acts. See, e.g., FED.R. Civ. P. 37(a)
("reasonable expenses incurred" in obtaining order to compel discovery awarded as sanction); ED. R. Crv. P. 37(c) (same award, in proving matter which party failed, without
reason, to admit); FEn. R. Civ. P. 41(d) (plaintiff asserting previously dismissed claim
against same defendant may pay "costs of the action"); Fa. R. Civ. P. 68 (offeree not
recovering judgment more favorable than rejected offer must pay "costs incurred" after

rejection).
55 6 F. Supp. 568, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
56 Id.
57 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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motives are highly suspect.58 The bad faith exception may be of use to
the environmentalist seeking personal compensation under one of the
traditional tort theories.5 9 If the defendant-for example, a developer,
a public utility, or an industrial corporation-by its polluting activities
flagrantly and callously ignores the plaintiff's clear property interests,
such conduct may be considered evidence of bad faith.10 Environmental
litigation of wide-scale public benefit, however, usually deals with
emerging issues that lack the legal precedents of civil rights and desegregation case law.0 ' This increases the difficulty of demonstrating that a
party's conduct was so violative of recognized legal standards that it
constituted bad faith. Although the bad faith exception may become
more viable in future years as environmental law solidifies, presently
an award of legal fees to a successful litigant is more likely under the
equitable fund or private attorney general theories.
B.

Equitable Fund Exception
The equitable fund exception to the general rule against awards
of legal fees has two branches: the more traditional, monetary "common fund" doctrine, and the newer, nonmonetary "substantial benefit"
variant.
The traditional common fund exception applies whenever a litigant in an individual or a representative capacity creates, preserves,
or increases a fund, the pecuniary benefits of which extend to a definite
class of persons.6 2 In such a situation, the court can order the successful
litigant's legal expenses to be paid out of the common fund to prevent
unjust enrichment by spreading the cost of the litigation equitably
among all of its true beneficiaries.0 3 The common fund exception was
first set forth in Trustees v. Greenough, 4 in which a bondholder's successful action to set aside fraudulent conveyances by the defendant
trustees resulted in the recovery of trust assets in which all of the
bondholders would share. The Supreme Court held that fairness demanded that the costs as well as the benefits of the litigation be shared
58 See notes 44 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
59 See note 28 supra.
00 Although not ruling on an award of legal fees, the court in a pollution case of
a decade ago quoted the testimony of an industry official whose indifference to environmental concerns reflected a calculated view of pollution as a mere business expense: "'It
is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control fluorides.'" Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert,
824 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963). But see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
257 N.E.2d 870, 809 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
61 See notes 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
62 See MooRE
54.77[2], at 1705-06.
63 See text accompanying note 66 infra.
04 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
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by all of the bondholders. 65 To deny the complainant an award out

of the recovered fund "would not only be unjust to him, but it would
give to the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the
fund an unfair advantage." 6
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,617 a bank depositor established a lien on trust deposits in the possession of the bank's receiver.
Although the depositor sued as an individual, the stare decisis effect of
her successful action assured fourteen other similarly-situated trustees
of their right to recover their interests in the bonds held by the defendant. 68 Since the definite class of bank depositors with similar claims
received this benefit, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's litigation
expenses could be paid out of the common fund, even though that fund
was merely protected and not actually paid into court.69
The traditional common fund over which the court exercises its
jurisdiction always represents a benefit capable of translation into
money. Conceptually, however, the fund is the aggregate benefit produced by the litigation, and the court taxes any convenient resource
jointly owned by the true beneficiaries. Since the court's power to award
legal fees is totally independent of the existence of a fund,7 0 it is not
difficult to understand the judicial development from the monetary
common fund theory to the nonmonetary substantial benefit variant.
To award fees under the substantial benefit rule, the court must have
jurisdiction over some resource which is not at issue in the litigation
but which is common to all the beneficiaries.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,71 the Supreme Court accepted
the substantial benefit variant of the equitable fund exception. 72 In
Mills, a minority shareholder brought a derivative action to dissolve a
corporate merger which had been approved by shareholders whose votes
were allegedly solicited by a misleading proxy statement made by the
management of the merged corporation in violation of section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.73 The Court ruled that since
65 Id. at
66 Id.

532.

67 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
68 Id. at 166.
69 Id. at 167.
70 Sprague v. Ticonic Natl Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough,

105 U.S. 527, 532, 537 (1882).
71 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
72 This decision also established the foundation for a bridge from the fund exception
to the private attorney general theory. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text infra.
73 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). The plaintiff further relied on SEC Rule 14a-9, which
was promulgated under § 14(a) of the Act and which specifically prohibits false or
misleading proxy solicitation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972).
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the proxy solicitation was necessary to complete the merger and was
materially misleading, a cause of action under the Act had been established. 74 However, before remanding the case for consideration of the
proper relief, the Court awarded interim attorney fees and litigation
expenses to the successful plaintiff.
In dealing with the issue of awarding interim expenses, the Mills
Court dispensed with two problems of statutory construction raised
by the defendant: (1) the argument of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,75 and (2) the related argument that since Congress had detailed
all of the remedies available to a plaintiff in the Act and had not
mentioned any award of litigation expenses, a court was precluded from
making such an equitable award of fees. 76 Noting that the essence of
the fund doctrine is to prevent the unjust enrichment of fund beneficiaries at the expense of the plaintiff, 77 the Court emphasized that it

could award legal fees whether or not the fund was a pecuniary asset.78
It endorsed the substantial benefit version of the fund exception as
developed by lower courts, 79 holding that an award of fees was appropriate when the fund constituted a nonmonetary benefit to the
corporation and its shareholders and the Court had jurisdiction over
material (corporate) assets of the fund beneficiaries out of which the
award could be paid. 0 In Mills, the substantial benefit derived from
74 396 U.S. at 885.
75 In Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 886 U.S. 714 (1967), which arose
under § 85 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970)), the Court held that "Congress
meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid
trademark has been infringed" (386 U.S. at 719) and thus intended "to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act." Id. at 721.
The Court in Mills found no such detailed scheme of remedies in the Securities Exchange
Act and consequently held that the Act was no bar to the courts' exercise of their
equitable powers. 396 U.S. at 390-91.
76 Sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the Act specifically provide for awards of attorney fees,
but § 14(a) is silent on the point. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), r(a), n(a) (1970). In JI. Case Co.
v. Borak, 877 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court found an implied right of action in § 14(a)
despite the express provision for prosecution by the SEC in § 27 of the Act. The Mills
Court found the rationale of that decision equally applicable to an award of attorney
fees. See 396 U.S. at 890-91.
77 896 U.S. at 392.
78 "The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary
recovery from which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award based on
this rationale." Id.
79 Id. at 895-96.
80 The Court declared that an equitable award of fees is appropriate
to permit reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that
will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them.
Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added).
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the shareholder's derivative suit was "fair and informed corporate
suffrage.""'
The Mills equitable fund or substantial benefit exception may
provide a means of financing public-interest environmental suits when
used in conjunction with the public trust doctrine. 82 Under the public
trust doctrine, the government is responsible for preserving public
trust property. 83 For purposes of paying litigation expenses, a close
analogy can be drawn between the corporation in Mills and a state
government 4 derelict in its duty to preserve the environment. Similar
to litigation that protects corporate democracy for the benefit of shareholders, an action that successfully enjoins public officials who have
breached their duties as "public trustees" effectively preserves a nonmonetary fund held in public trust-the environment-and thereby
substantially benefits the public. In both cases the fund exception requires that the ultimate beneficiaries-the stockholders or the public
-share the costs of the successful litigation.85 In Mills, the corporation,
as both the real party plaintiff and the nominal defendant, was taxed
with the plaintiff's legal fees primarily because it represented the
aggregate of those who were directly benefited. In environmental litigation, however, federal and state governments are immune from direct
attack and can only be sued indirectly through the fiction of suing
their officers and agencies as separate entities.8 6 Even then, federal
officials are subject only to ordinary costs, although state officials and
agencies can be assessed costs that include attorney and expert witness
81 Id. at 396; accord, Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (substantial benefit of "greater democracy and fair dealing in internal union affairs"
which furthered aims of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970)).
82 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
83 Historically, the public trust doctrine has been limited to shorelands, lakes, rivers,
streams, and parklands. See Sax, supra note 19, at 556. Professor Sax has summarized
the key elements of the public trust doctrine as follows:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental
conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
Id. at 490 (emphasis in original). In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the
Supreme Court held that Illinois may not abdicate its legislative authority over navigation
on Lake Michigan, because title to its shores and waters is "held in trust for the people
of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interferences of
private parties." Id. at 452.
84 See text accompanying note 87 infra.
85 See Comment, supra note 39, at 329-30.
86 See note 149 and accompanying text infra.
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fees. 7 Because the sovereign immunity fiction deems the state official
to have acted as an individual, 88 he alone is technically liable for the
costs, not the state government. However, the future lies with those
forward-looking states that indemnify their officers who are sued for
their official conduct.8 9 Under such state statutes a court's order for an
official to pay costs will mean that the ultimate beneficiaries-the public-will share the burden of the litigation expenses in accord with
the substantial benefit-equitable fund doctrine by indirectly financing
the indemnification of the officer through their taxes.
C. Private Attorney General Exception
Mills actually announced a hybrid doctrine with aspects of both
the equitable fund and the private attorney general exceptions. In
addition to its substantial benefit rule, the case arguably rests on what
one writer has called "a law enforcement-as-benefit rationale." 90 The
Court pointed out that private actions brought to vindicate strong
public policies9 1 have intrinsic value to the public. Not only are the
particular shareholders benefited but shareholders everywhere enjoy
the fruits of such private law enforcement: "iP]rivate stockholders'
actions of this sort 'involve corporate therapeutics,' and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement
'92
of the proxy statute.
87 See notes 158-61 8&165-78 and accompanying text infra. When a federal official
who is sued in his official capacity is taxed ordinary costs, the United States pays those
costs. See note 158 infra.
88 See note 149 and accompanying text infra.
89 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1973) (state will pay judgment awarded
against public employee sued for "act or omission occurring within the scope of his employment'); N.Y. PuB. OrFICERs LAw § 17(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (state will indemnify
officer or employee sued while "acting in discharge of his duties and within the scope of
his employment"). However, California's indemnification provisions do not extend to the
employee guilty of "actual fraud, corruption or actual malice." CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 825.6(b)
(West Supp. 1973). New York's statute precludes indemnification if the damages resulted
from the officer's or the employee's "willful and wrongful act or gross negligence." N.Y.
PuB. OFricEas LAw § 17(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972). See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRAIVE LAw
TEXT § 26.06 (Sd ed. 1972).
D0 Comment, supra note 39, at 326.
91 "mhe stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed
corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, peti-

tioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders." 396
U.S. at 396.
92 Id. (footnote omitted, emphasis added). The Court borrowed Professor George
Hornstein's characterization--"Iegar' or "corporate therapeutics"-for the substantial
benefit justifying court-awarded fees. See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. Rv. 658, 659, 662-63 (1956).
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The effects of the substantial benefit rule and the private attorney
general exception are quite similar; yet, their respective rationales for
awarding fees to the plaintiff are fundamentally different. While the
substantial benefit rule taxes such fees against the true beneficiaries of
the action to prevent unjust enrichment, the private attorney general
doctrine taxes the defendant93 because the plaintiff has vindicated a
strong public policy and thus served the public 4 Moreover, in publicinterest environmental litigation, the fund theory presents conceptual
intricacies which are obviated by the more direct approach of the
private attorney general concept. 5
93 The fundamental rationale of the fund doctrine is that the party made to pay the
litigation expenses is in some sense benefited or enriched by the results of the litigation.
In Mills, the corporation is said to be enriched by the fulfillment of corporate democracy.
The Mills Court also pointed to the general benefit to corporate shareholders in having
the federal proxy statute enforced. 396 U.S. at 396. This wider public benefit suggests the
private attorney general approach: the party made to bear the litigation expenses does
not necessarily benefit except as that party may be considered part of the general public
which benefits from the private enforcement of strong public policies.
94 In both the equitable fund and private attorney general cases, the taxation of costs
is not intended by the court to be a penalty, but rather an equitable allocation of expenses
between both parties. See note 89 supra. In Mills, the Court emphasized this distinction
when it discussed the equitable fund theory:
To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in
establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the
expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited from them and that
would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.
896 U.S. at 396-97. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court
awarded legal fees under the private attorney general exception and stated:
We cannot emphasize enough that in granting this motion, the purpose is
not to saddle the losing party with the financial burden in order to punish him,
rather we shift the financial burden in order to effectuate a strong Congressional
policy.
Id. at 102.
95 Several courts have noted the confines of the fund theory. In Bradley v. School Bd.,
58 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), Judge Merhige described the attendant limitations of the
fund doctrine in public-interest actions:
School desegregation cases, or any suits against governmental bodies, do not fit this
fund model without considerable cutting and trimming. This is a class suit to be
sure, with class relief, but to say that the plaintiff class will actually in effect pay
their attorneys if the School Board is made to pay counsel fees entails a number
of unproved assumptions about the extent to which pupils pay for their free
public schooling.
Id. at 85-86. Likewise, in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the
court noted that since Mills extended the fund doctrine to cover nonpecuniary benefits,
"it has become exceedingly difficult to trace the benefits of litigation to their ultimate
beneficiaries, so as to apportion the attorneys' fees amongst them." Id. at 97 (footnote
omitted).
Other courts have attempted to apply the fund theory, even though the private
attorney general doctrine might have been more appropriate. See, e.g., Brewer v. School
Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1972) ("quasi-application of the 'common fund' doctrine"
where "pecuniary benefit to the students," who became entitled to receive free busing
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The private attorney general exception was first articulated in
cases which sought to eradicate racial discrimination. In Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises,06 the Supreme Court analyzed the discretionary
award provision in Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 97 The plaintiff
in Piggie Park had successfully sued to enjoin the defendants from
operating racially-discriminatory restaurants. The issue on appeal was
whether attorney fees could be awarded only if the defendants had
defended the action in bad faith. The Supreme Court rejected such a
narrow interpretation of the Act and noted that suits under Title II
were private in form only: 98 a plaintiff could not recover damages
under the statute but must seek an injunction as a" 'private attorney
general.'-"9 The Court reasoned that unless the financial burden of
vindicating these important public as well as private civil rights was
lifted from the plaintiffs, the aims of the Act would be thwarted. 10 0
It concluded that a private enforcer under Title II should "ordinarily
recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust." 10 1
The view that private suits are necessary to help enforce strong
legislative policy and should be encouraged by the equitable award of
litigation expenses has received recognition in other civil rights cases
under older statutes that are silent on the question of awarding such
expenses. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.10 2 is a landmark case in
this area. The plaintiff in Lee successfully prosecuted a violation of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866103 based upon the private right of action
104
implied in that Act and recognized in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Citing the requirement in Jones that the federal courts fashion "an
effective equitable remedy" 10 5 in racial discrimination cases, the Fifth
Circuit in Lee held that private actions were essential to implement
the "strong congressional policy behind the rights" embodied in the
because of suit, deemed to accrue to school board); Bright v. Philadelphia-BaltimoreWashington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (violations of Securities
Exchange Act enjoined; defendant charged with fees because entire exchange and its
members benefited from action).
96 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
07 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-(b) (1970) (allows "prevailing party" to recover "reasonable at-

torney's fee" at court's discretion).
98 890 U.S. at 401.
D9 Id. at 402.
.00 Id.

101 Id.
102 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
103 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
104 892 U.S. 409 (1968).

105 Id. at 414 n.18.
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Act.10 6 An equitable award of attorney fees was therefore considered
10 7
an appropriate remedy.
In Sims v. Amos, 10 8 a three-judge federal court found the Alabama
legislature malapportioned and ordered the plaintiff's plan for singlemember legislative districts implemented. The court awarded the plaintiffs their costs of the litigation, including $14,822.50 in attorney fees,
assessable against the defendants. 10 9 Although the defendants' bad faith
was evident," 0 the court made the award under the private attorney
general exception. Regardless of the defendants' good or bad faith, the
plaintiffs were held to be entitled to attorney fees because they had
"benefited their class and ha[d] effectuated a strong congressional pol1

icy." i

106 444 F.2d at 145.
107 The court in Lee substantiated its view that an equitable award was appropriate
by referring to the fee provisions in the newer civil rights legislation. Id. at 146. This
comparative technique is also applicable in environmental cases because the new federal
laws have fee provisions (see note 35 and accompanying text supra), and many actions
arising outside the coverage of these laws can further the same public goals.
Other courts have followed the rationale of Lee. See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. 1972) (extends Lee to cover 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d
852 (1st Cir. 1972) (refusal to lease apartment held violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970));
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (racial discrimination in hiring of
state police violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
108 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
109 Id. at 695. The defendants were Alabama's Governor, Attorney General, Secretary
of State, and certain state legislators.
110 The court noted that the Alabama legislature had neglected, if not totally disregarded, its duty to reapportion. Id. at 693-94.
111 Id. at 694. "Indeed, under such circumstances, the award loses much of its
discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective remedy a court should fashion
to encourage public-minded suits and to carry out congressional policy." Id. (citation
omitted).
Recently, in a desegregation case, the Fouth Circuit reversed a lower court's award of
litigation expenses which was based alternatively on the private attorney general doctrine
and the bad faith exception. See Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir.
1972), rev'g 53 F.R.D. 28, 41 (E.D. Va. 1971). The upper court also reversed the district
court's finding of bad faith. See note 50 supra. The court of appeals did not consider the
encouragement of private enforcement of public policies a proper judicial function. Otherwise, the court argued, the private attorney general exception would "launch courts upon
the difficult and complex task of determining what is public policy, an issue normally
reserved for legislative determination." 472 F.2d at 329. Moreover, the court noted, Congress
has provided for fee awards in specified cases, and its silence in others is indicative of a
desire to exclude the award of fees in such cases. Id. at 330.
In rebuttal to Bradley, several points are noteworthy. The argument that legislative
silence precludes judicial activism was specifically rejected in Mills. See note 75 and accompanying text supra. The Bradley court's philosophy, however, raises the more fundamental issue of the judiciary's proper role in the protection of substantive rights. In the
face of legislative inactivity or oversight, judicial activism has often proved vital to the
recognition of important rights. In its bold decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
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Use of the private attorney general doctrine should not be limited
civil
rights cases. Any area of great public concern should be a
to
possible candidate for application of the doctrine. Commentators have
pointed to public-interest environmental litigation as an area of the law
fused with strong statutory policy 1l2 and deserving of treatment under
the doctrine." 3 Such an environmental action easily fits the mold established in Mills, Piggie Park, and Lee: the litigating environmentalist
who successfully halts some phase of ecological destruction affecting a
significant number of people has performed a public service by asserting
the environmental rights of that class and of the public at large. The
defendants" 4 in such actions should shoulder the plaintiff's full litigation expenses because of the importance of implementing policies
vital to the health and welfare of all citizens.
U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court first struck down the invidious discrimination existing
in our separate-but-equal schools and thereby implemented the otherwise hollow guarantee
of equal protection. When such important rights exist, the courts have a duty to find
appropriate remedies that will effectively protect those rights. A right without a practical
means of enforcement becomes largely meaningless. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
292 U.S. 409 (1968). An award of attorney and expert witness fees is a practical aid in the
enforcement of substantive rights.
Certainly the courts' task in determining the proper case for such an award is a
difficult one, but to refuse action because there has been no express legislative approval is
too simple a solution. A court's categorical refusal to exercise its equitable powers in aid
of important substantive rights in appropriate cases suggests an abdication of judicial
responsibility. Paradoxically, in Bradley, the district court's wisdom of allowing attorney
fees was confirmed in 1972 when Congress filled the gap in Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act by passing the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1601-19 (Supp. 1973).
The new Act specifically authorizes awards of attorney fees in desegration cases such as
Bradley. Id.§ 1617. The Fourth Circuit refused to apply this provision retroactively, even
though a cogent dissent by Justice Winter pointed out the reasonableness of such an
application. 472 F.2d at 32-39.
The need for the private attorney general exception in certain environmental cases
is perhaps even stronger than in the more heavily-legislated field of civil rights. The new
federal environmental laws require time to become effective because of the delay necessary
before pollution standards can be fully implemented. In the interim, the courts should
make use of the private attorney general exception as an aid to the implementation of
these strong environmental policies, if only as a stopgap measure. Congress has indicated
a feasible method of enforcement which the courts should utilize in making the older,
silent environmental laws truly effective.
112 The cornerstone of American environmental policy is the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
113 See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 776; Comment, supra note 39, at 329-30.
114 Public officials as well as private polluters are possible defendants. See text accompanying note 140 infra. In taxing private polluters with legal fees, a court must inevitably weigh the interests of the public, whose rights are really at issue, against the
individual's ability to pay. The private defendant will probably be a sufficiently large entity able to bear the expenses if the case is deemed to have reached "public-interest"
proportions.
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IV
La Raza Unida v. Volpe
The first application of the private attorney general exception to
environmental litigation appeared in a recent federal case, La Raza
Unida v. Volpe.115 In a class action, the plaintiffs won a preliminary
injunction" 6 against the construction of a California federal highway
because the defendants-the state and federal governments" T7-had
failed to comply with federal environmental protection and housing assistance laws. 118 These laws required the defendants to make special
efforts to preserve parks, wildlife refuges, and historic sites. In addition,
the defendants were under a duty to seek feasible and prudent alternatives in planning the highway in order to minimize the hardship to those
who would be displaced from their homes by the proposed highway.
Although the statutes forming the basis of the plaintiffs' substantive
claims were silent concerning fee awards, the La Raza court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees from the state defendants., 9
In awarding fees under the private attorney general exception, 20
the La Raza court cited three factors which governed its decision:
"the strength of the Congressional policy, the number of people benefited by the litigants' efforts, and the necessity and financial burden of
21
private enforcement."'
A.

Strong Public Policy

In examining the importance of the congressional policies toward
environmental protection and housing relocation assistance, the court
concluded that "[f]ew public policies are accorded the weight and
115 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

116 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
117 In addition to the United States Secretary of Transportation, the defendants included the Director of the Federal Division of Engineering, the California Highway Department, the California Department of Public Works, the Chief Highway Engineer for
California, and the Mayor and the City Manager of Hayward, California.
118 See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, § 15(a), 23 U.S.C. § 188 (1970); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970); Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1970);
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
119 57 F.R.D. at 101-02.
120 The court also held that an expense award was justified even if the plaintiffs'
lawyers had donated their services free of charge or had been paid out of tax-exempt
foundation money. Id. at 98 n.6; accord, Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d
534 (5th Cir. 1970).
121 57 F.R.D. at 99.
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priority of those present in this lawsuit."'1 22 Mr. Justice Black's con123
curring opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
impressed the La Raza court with the importance of judges and public
administrators strictly adhering to the standards prescribed by Congress
for environmental protection. 1 24 Moreover, the environmental priorities established by the sweeping language of the National Environmental Policy Act,125 coupled with the detailed criteria set forth in
the more specific statutes for planning highways and assisting dis126
locatees,'
compelled the La Raza court to recognize "an intense concern by the Congress over the problems of highway displacement and
1 27
environmental protection.'
B.

Number of People Benefited

The second factor La Raza considered was the number of people
benefited by the litigation. Although precise identification of class
members is not required under the private attorney general exception,12s the size of the class is important. Drawing ever widening circles,
the court defined the beneficiaries. In its view, approximately 5,000

"displaced persons" benefited directly, while another 200,000 residents
of nearby towns "derived substantial benefits" in being assured "that
the last remaining parks in southern Alameda County [would] not be
destroyed until formal fact-findings and policy determinations [were]
made.' 1 29 Moreover, residents of the surrounding San Francisco Bay
area benefited indirectly because planning would now be required to
minimize the impact of the dislocatees on the crowded housing market.
122

Id.

401 U.S. 402, 421 (1971) (Black, J., concurring):
That congressional command [23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970)] should not be taken lightly
by the Secretary or by this Court. It represents a solemn determination of the
highest law-making body of this Nation that the beauty and health-giving facilities
of our parks are not to be taken away for public roads without hearings, factfindings, and policy determinations under the supervision of a Cabinet officer ....
124 E.g., Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, § 15(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); Department
of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
12 See note 118 supra.
127 337 F. Supp. at 229; see 57 F.R.D. at 99. By awarding the plaintiffs legal fees and
thereby encouraging private enforcement of -vital public policies, the La Raza court
arguably was fulfilling its mandate from Congress to give full force to these strong environmental public policies.
128 The private attorney general doctrine recognizes that the private law enforcer
performs a public service whenever the benefited class represents an important segment
of the public. See note 93 and text accompanying note 94 supra. The court in La Raza
noted that "[w]henever a strong public policy has been effectuated by definition numerous
people receive some degree of benefit." 57 F.R.D. at 100 n.8 (emphasis in original).
129 57 F.R.D. at 100.
123
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Indeed, the court concluded that all Californians benefited by "'state
therapeutics' "130 and the decision's positive effect on future highway
planning. The court recognized that public-oriented actions to save
the environment are really "everyone's business"' 31 and that "almost
all of society is better off when public policies in these areas have been
strengthened."'' 32
C. Necessity and Burden of Private Enforcement
Finally, La Raza evaluated the practical necessity for and financial
burden of "private vigilance and enforcement.' 133 The court found
that public-interest actions by concerned citizens are inherently valuable. 134 Indeed, the court argued that private policing actions become
a virtual necessity when the public officials charged with protecting the
public's environmental rights ignore their constitutional or statutory
duties.13 5 La Raza advocated a broad judicial policy of fostering such
public-interest actions by awarding fees under the private attorney
general exception: "Responsible representatives of the public should
be encouraged to sue, particularly where governmental entities are
involved as defendants."'18 6 Without the aid of an equitable award of
litigation expenses, the average citizen simply is no match for public
officials and agencies armed with vastly greater resources and expertise. 3T7La Raza held that the possibility of an equitable award of
fees wai necessary not only to motivate other concerned citizens to
emulate the plaintiffs' efforts in proper cases but also to avoid effectively
penalizing the plaintiffs for prosecuting such civic-minded and widely
beneficial litigation. 138
180 Id. The court paraphrased Professor Hornstein's term "corporate therapeutics" in
describing the statewide benefits that flow from enforcement of strong public-interest
legislation. See note 92 supra.
13' 57 F.R.D. at 100. NEPA supports the court on this point. Section 101(c) of NEPA
declares that "Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment
and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
132 57 F.R.D. at 100 (footnote omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 100-01; see note 31 and accompanying text supra.
138 "The only public entities that might have brought suit in this case were named
as defendants in this action and vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contentions. Only a private
party could have been expected to bring this litigation .... " 57 F.R.D. at 101.
136 Id. at 100-01.
137 In many "public interest" cases only injunctive relief is sought, and the average attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of "taking
on" an entity such as the California Department of Highways, with no prospect
of financial compensation for the efforts and expenses rendered. The expense of
litigation in such a case poses a formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacle.

Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
138 [A] private party is least able to bear the tremendous economic burdens. To
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D. Scope of the Private Attorney General Exception
La Raza establishes the private attorney general exception to the
general rule against fee-shifting in the context of a suit against public
officials. Although involving the peculiarities of sovereign immunity,139
La Raza also raises the question of whether the private attorney general theory should be limited to public defendants, or should be extended to private defendants as well. La Raza in no way suggests that
the private attorney general doctrine cannot be applied to private as
well as public defendants. 40 To the contrary, there is a close parallel
between a private corporate giant and the awesome California Department of Highways. Thus, the implication of La Raza is clear. In an
environmental suit for specific relief, when the private defendant's
economic resources and expertise greatly overshadow the successful
private plaintiff's meager funds, an equitable award of the plaintiff's
litigation expenses under the private attorney general exception is
justified if the benefits of the action extend to a substantial segment
of the public.
A comparison of the public trust-equitable fund theory' 4' with
the private attorney general concept reveals the flexibility of the latter.
The fund approach rests on the principle that taxing the government
is the fairest way to make the general public-the beneficiaries of the
plaintiff's public service-pay its fair share of the litigation expense.
Subject to the intricacies of sovereign immunity, 4 2 the fund theory is
viable for public defendants in environmental actions. However, it is
useless as a basis for taxing private defendants in such actions because
no analogous taxation of the public can be hypothesized. On the other
force private litigants to bear their own costs here would be tantamount to a
penalty, and it seems somewhat inequitable to punish litigants who have policed
those charged with implementing and following Congressional mandates. Hence,
the fact that only a private party could be reasonably expected to bring this
action is one additional factor supporting the awarding of attorneys' fees in this
case.
Id.
139 See notes 144-81 and accompanying text infra.

140 The civil rights cases make no distinction between public and private defendants.
compare Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), with Lee v. Southern Home
Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). The La Raza court's reliance on these cases (57
F.R.D. at 98-102) suggests a tacit acceptance of this nondistinction between public and
private defendants. One may argue, however, that this nondistinction is justified only in
civil rights cases because civil rights are more precious than environmental rights; thus,
one who violates rights that go to the roots of human dignity must be held to incur an
especially great liability. Arguably, however, the large-scale industrial polluter tramples
on rights and interests vital to life itself and likewise is obligated not to act so as to
deny the public the beauty and benefits of a clean environment.
141 See notes 82-89 and accompanying text supra.
142 See notes 144-81 infra.
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hand, the private attorney general theory makes no distinctions between
public and private defendants. The defendant simply pays the plaintiff's
litigation expenses because, between the two, equity favors the plaintiff
143
as a public servant and law enforcer.
V
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In assessing the viability of the equitable doctrines that allow
awards of legal fees, the environmental litigant suing a public entity
or official must contend with the defense of sovereign immunity. This
ancient common law doctrine holds that private individuals cannot
1 45
144
sue the state as sovereign in its own courts unless the state waives
its inherent immunity from suit. Thus, federal sovereign immunity
protects the United States in the federal courts, while state sovereign
immunity protects each state in its own courts. Both defenses have been
termed "domestic" sovereign immunity. 146 Moreover, each state is constitutionally guaranteed a different type of sovereign immunity by the
eleventh amendment-protection from private suit in the federal
courts. 147 This latter protection has been called "foreign" sovereign
143 It would appear to be a prerequisite that the private defendant's conduct be of
sufficient magnitude to make the plaintiff's action in halting the pollution a substantial
benefit to the public. Cf. notes 114 & 128 supra.
144 Another view of the doctrine is that no sovereign can be sued in any court unless
it consents to the suit. Such was the view taken by Alexander Hamilton in 1788, quoted
by the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890).
145 Examples of waiver by the federal sovereign are the citizen suit provisions in the
newer federal environmental laws. See note 23 supra. A state has been deemed to waive its
immunity when it participates in federally controlled activities. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959). For a discussion of the
ramifications of waiver-voluntary or involuntary-see Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 297
F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); J. BREcHER & M. Nmme, supra note 33, at 110-11.
146 The terms "domestic" and "foreign" sovereign immunity are suggested in Scalia,
Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 DicH. L. REv. 867, 886 (1970).
147 The eleventh amendment, by its terms, is confined to suits by citizens of another
state:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
The Supreme Court has long held that state sovereign immunity protects a state from
suits in federal court brought by its own citizens without thr state's consent. See Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 21 (1890). By its interpretative decisions the Court has extended the protection of
the eleventh amendment to suits not otherwise covered by the amendment, in effect recog-
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immunity14 s to emphasize that the state is not the sovereign in the
federal courts. The courts have circumscribed the potentially deleterious effects of both domestic and foreign sovereign immunity through
the familiar process of creating judicial exceptions.
Whether the sovereign is a separate entity from its officers and
agencies is the crucial, if not sophistical, distinction drawn in the debate
over sovereign immunity. 149 If a suit against an officer is held to be a
suit against his principal (the sovereign), then the defense-if raised
by the defendant-is a complete bar to the action, or, in an eleventh
amendment case, completely ousts a federal court of its jurisdiction. 150
nizing the states' common law (foreign) sovereign immunity under the rubric of the
eleventh amendment. In referring to the concept that consent is the key to a state's
waiver of its inherent immunity from suit, the Court has spoken broadly of the eleventh
amendment as establishing a personal defense which a state can waive at its pleasure. See
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). But the Court has never suggested that a state
can confer federal jurisdiction in a suit by citizens of another state merely by consenting
to be sued. The eleventh amendment ousts the federal courts of jurisdiction in such
cases, whether or not the state has consented, or is deemed to have consented, to suit.
148 See note 146 supra.
149 K. DAvis, supra note 89, at § 27.04. When an officer of the state is sued for his
official acts, the judicially-developed fiction that circumvents sovereign immunity is that
he is deemed to have acted as an individual, independently of the state. The officer is
"stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908). The
fiction is employed only to allow suits in certain situations. See notes 153-56 and accompanying text infra. When the fiction is used, a problem arises with regard to the defendant
officer's liability for costs. The hypertechnical distinction between suing an officer as an
individual for his official acts and suing him as an official for those same acts can lead to
different practical results insofar as the effectiveness of a court order requiring a defendant
to pay costs.
In the context of environmental litigation, when specific relief is sought, this hypertechnical distinction is irrelevant with regard to the effectiveness of an injunction or mandamus order. But is the officer personally liable for payment of the costs which are taxable
as an integral part of that judgment? In the federal situation, the United States apparently pays the ordinary costs for which its officials become liable when sued in their official
capacities. See note 158 infra. Payment is thus assured. By definition, a state official would
appear to be personally liable for costs, which may include substantial legal fees (see notes

169-81 and accompanying text infra), if he is successfully sued as an individual, or concurrently as an individual and an official. However, if a state official is sued only as an official

or if the complaint is ambiguous as to the capacity in which the official is sued, an order
for him to pay costs would be enforceable only out of funds available to him in his official

capacity, even though for purposes of circumventing sovereign immunity he is deemed to
be personally liable. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 36 F.R.D. 174, 175 (W-). La. 1964).
If no such funds are available (e.g., if there is no contingency or all-purpose fund available
in the official's current operating budget) or authorized, the winner may go unreimbursed.
If personal liability for official conduct seems unduly harsh, the problem lies not with the
equitable principles governing fee-shifting but rather with the "sophistical and erratic"
sovereign immunity morass, which is sorely in need of reform and clarification. See
K. DAvis, supra note 89, at § 27.07.
150 "The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
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Originally, the Supreme Court established for the federal courts
the "party of record" test for determining if a private suit against a
public official is in effect an action against the sovereign. If the United
States or a given state was not mentioned in the pleadings, the action
was not barred by either federal domestic or eleventh amendment
foreign sovereign immunity.151 However, to avoid rendering the
eleventh amendment meaningless, the Court later retreated from this
simplistic position and established the "real party in interest" test,
which holds that suing an official in his representative capacity is tanta52
mount to suing the sovereign and thus is not permitted..
Eventually, the Court carved out two basic exceptions to both
federal sovereign immunity and eleventh amendment state immunity.
An action against an officer (or agency) is permitted if the statute
governing the official's actions is unconstitutional,5 3 or the official's
action or inaction is outside the scope of his constitutional or statutory
authority. 5 4 The rationale underlying both these exceptions is that
the officer in both situations acts illegally and without the authority
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter." Hawaii v. Gordon,
373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
151 "In deciding who are parties to the suit, the court will not look beyond the
record." Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872); see Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
152 [I]t was at one time held that the Eleventh Amendment . . . was applicable
only to cases in which the State was named in the record as a party defendant.
But later rulings have modified that decision, and held that the amendment
applies to any suit brought in name against an officer of the State, when "the
State, though not named, is the real party against which the relief is asked,
and the judgment will operate."
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902), quoting Osborn v. United States Bank,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). One author has noted the frequent confusion between the
concept that the state is the real party in interest and the view that the state is an indispensable party to the suit. See Scalia, supra note 146, at 887 n.89.
153 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (eleventh amendment immunity denied
to state official enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state statute). The unconstitutional
acts exception also applies in federal sovereign immunity cases. See, e.g., Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
154 See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912) (federal sovereign immunity
denied to federal official alleged to have acted in excess of his statutory authority). Likewise, federal officials acting in excess of constitutional authority can claim no immunity
from suit. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
The ultra vires exception also applies in eleventh amendment cases. See Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 297 (1937):
[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials can, consistently with the
constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be
restrained is without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or
Constitution of the United States ....
The Eleventh Amendment, which denies
to the citizen the right to resort to a federal court to compel or restrain state
action, does not preclude suit against a wrongdoer merely because he asserts that
his acts are within an official authority which the state does not confer.
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of the sovereign. 15 Thus, he is not the sovereign's agent or alter ego
and can be sued.1 6
The sovereign immunity defense can arise twice in an environmental suit. First, the defendant official may challenge the court's
jurisdiction over the main action by arguing sovereign immunity.
Second, even after a proper trial on the substantive issues culminating
in a judgment against the defendant, sovereign immunity may bar an
award of attorney and expert witness fees in a later stage of the same
action or in a separate, collateral action brought to collect fees. The
sovereign immunity problems present in this second action can best
be discussed in terms of the possible forums and defendants.
A.

Fees in the Federal Courts
1. Federal Officials as Defendants

Absent specific statutory authorization such as that found in the
57
citizen suit provisions of the newer federal environmental statutes,
reasonable attorney fees cannot be taxed against the United States, its
officials or its agencies.15 8 Prior to 1966, federal sovereign immunity
155 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 837 U.S. 682 (1949), refined the
ultra vires category by extending immunity to an official acting within the scope of his
authority who makes errors of judgment, even though his conduct may be "tortious
under general law." Id. at 695.
156 The sophistry of the sovereign immunity fiction (see note 149 supra) is especially
evident in the case of an official who carries out his required duties and simply
enforces a state statute, which remains the law until overturned by the courts on grounds
of unconstitutionality.
In addition to these two major exceptions, certain special areas of federal administrative law have traditionally functioned unhindered by sovereign immunity. Historically,
there have been exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine in litigation pertaining
to public lands, postal administration, and tax disputes. See Scalia, supra note 146, at
913-17. For an analysis of the sovereign immunity patchwork of exceptions and recommended reform, see Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The
INeed for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
PartiesDefendant, 68 Mcn. L. Rav. 387 (1970).
Other courts have formulated various distinctions for purposes of circumventing
sovereign immunity, ranging from governmental versus non-governmental (a "quagmire
that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations," Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955)) to ministerial versus discretionary. See Clackamus County v.
McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909, rehearing denied,
349 U.S. 934 (1955). However, a complete survey of the exceptions to sovereign immunity
is unnecessary for the purposes of this Note.
157 See note 85 supra.
158 28 US.C. § 2412 (1970) (emphasis added), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1964),
provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs,
as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys[,] may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action
brought by or against the United States or any agency or official of the United
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precluded a federal court from taxing any costs against federal defendants, except as Congress might provide in special situations.0 In that
year, however, Congress partially lifted the immunity bar to allow
taxation of ordinary costs, 160 although it specifically proscribed the
taxation of "fees and expenses of attorneys" against federal defendants.160
Fees paid by a successful plaintiff to his own expert witnesses also
are not taxable against federal defendants above the amounts set for
ordinary witnesses. 162 The significance of this prohibition is that a
plaintiff will be encouraged to join state or private defendants whenever possible in his action in order to provide a possible defendant
from whom legal fees can be recovered. If the plaintiff is able to sue
only federal defendants but is unable to afford expert witnesses which
are essential to his case, he may request the court to exercise its inherent
States acting in his official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such
action.. . . Payment of a judgment for costs shall be as provided . . . for the
payment of judgments against the United States.
159 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b)-(c) (1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) (costs to
"prevailing party" in authorized contract actions and to "successful claimant" in authorized tort actions); see also Mooaa
54.75[3.-1].
160 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970) provides:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshall;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this titie.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in
the judgment or decree.
161 Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, § 1, 80 Stat. 308, amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1964) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970)).
162 The reasoning is as follows: § 2412 (28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b)-(c) (1970)) only waives
the federal sovereign's immunity from paying costs to the extent specified in § 1920. See
id. § 1920; cf. Cassata v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1971).
Section 1920 is cross-referenced to § 1821 which fixes the standard allowances payable out
of costs to any witness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1970). See also note 3 supra. Since the
Supreme Court had held that an award of fees for expert witnesses could not exceed an
award of expenses for ordinary witnesses (see Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 284
U.S. 444 (1932)), Congress decided that any mention of expert witness fees in the 1966
revision of § 1821 would be simply surplusage. See S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3 (1966). Thus, neither attorney nor expert witness fees incurred by the plaintiff can
be taxed as costs against a federal defendant absent specific statutory authority.
It is important to distinguish a court-appointed expert witness from an expert
witness who is hired independently by one of the litigants. If Congress accepts the
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 706, then the specific authorization in subsection (b)
of the Rule for taxing a federal defendant with the cost of a court-appointed expert
witness will override the general provisions of § 2412. See note 164 infra.

ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION FEES

1251

power to appoint its own expert, 163 though possibly nominated by the
plaintiff. 164
2. State Officials as Defendants
The Supreme Court has held that once a federal court has proper
jurisdiction over a state, eleventh amendment sovereign immunity does
not bar the taxation of costs against that state.'( 5 If a state official is
sued under the unconstitutional or ultra vires exceptions, such official
should be deemed an entity separate from his sovereign with no right
to claim immunity from costs.166 The courts, however, have not been
unanimous in their assessment of the sovereign immunity problem
with reference to state defendants.
The federal district court in La Raza found no sovereign immunity obstacle to assessing the state officials and state agencies with
equitable, nonstatutory costs. 1 67 In taxing the state defendants with
costs and fees, the court recognized that "the money will come from
the state treasury. '"108
The La Raza court distinguished 1 9 the contrary decision in Sincock v. Obara,170 in which it was held that sovereign immunity barred
163 See Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962).
164 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 706 authorizes the court to appoint its own
expert (although the parties may be requested to nominate candidates) and to include
the expert's fees in the taxable costs of the action. Thus, a defendant could be taxed with
the expense of a court-appointed expert under this Rule. See Proposed Fed. R. Evidence
706, printed in 56 F.R.D. 183, 286 (1972).
165 See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 73-74 (1927); Missouri v.
54.76-1.
Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660, 681 (1849). See also MooRE
106 See note 149 and text accompanying note 155 supra.
167 See 57 F.R.D. at 101-02. California's Chief Highway Engineer was sued "in his
individual and representative capacity" (id. at 95) for his failure to perform his nondiscretionary, statutory duties. Under the ultra vires exception (see note 154 and accompanying text supra), he was deemed to be an entity separate from California in both the
main action for specific relief and the later action for costs and legal fees. Thus, sovereign
immunity was denied to the state official for all purposes.
168 57 F.R.D. at 101. The court was pointing to the reality of the situation in
California, which has been a national leader in providing indemnification for any State
employee who is subjected to litigation "arising out of an act or omission occurring
within the scope of his employment." CAL. GoV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1973); see
K. DAvs, supra note 89, at § 26.06. The court assumed that California would interpret its
requirement of "within the scope of his employment" in a realistic fashion, uninfluenced
by mythical sovereign immunity distinctions, which, if followed blindly, would result in
personal liability for the officer who was deemed to have acted outside the scope of his
authority. Thus, although the officer's activities were ultra vires for purposes of the
sovereign immunity fiction in federal court, the state official was truly acting "within the
scope of his employment" and should be reimbursed under California law for any costs
he is ordered to pay.
169 57 F.R.D. at 101 n.11.

170 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970).
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an award of reasonable attorney fees in a successful class action that
had resulted in the reapportionment of the Delaware General Assembly. When presented with the plaintiff's request for attorney fees,
the court in Sincock raised the eleventh amendment argument sua
spontel7' and dismissed the suit on the basis that Delaware's sovereign
immunity ousted the federal court of jurisdiction to make such an
award in the absence of express statutory authority. 17 2 The Sincock
court recognized the possibility that Mills might be authority for an
equitable award of fees "if we could hold either the State of Delaware
or the individual defendants liable in their representative capacities."17 3
In considering the plaintiff's prayer for an injunction against the
enforcement of an unconstitutional election statute, the court in
Sincock deemed the suit to be against the state officials as individuals
in consonance with the Ex parte Young exception.Y4 However, in considering the plaintiff's request for an award of litigation expenses from
the state officials, the court deemed the suit to be against the state. In
addition to this double standard, Sincock injected further confusion
into the sovereign immunity morass by failing to distinguish costs from
damages.17 5 Although not citing them directly, the court apparently
relied on the Supreme Court cases that have barred suits against the
state for money damages because "the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public
administration." 17 6 These damages cases should not preclude a court
Id. at 1103 n.10.
Id. at 1103-05.
173 Id. at 1104.
174 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see note 153 and accompanying text supra.
175 The Sincock court noted its inability to find reasoned judicial authority for
granting "a money judgment against a State or a state employee." 320 F. Supp. at 1103.
This terminology is imprecise and fails to distinguish between a judgment for money
damages and one for specific relief. Both kinds of judgments entail court costs, but the
latter is not a "money judgment."
176 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947). The Supreme Court has also held that
when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.
Ford Motor Go. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). These cases are not
in point because they are premised on the assumption that a sovereign state should not
be affronted by being compelled to pay money damages, especially because of the possibility that punitive damages might be sought. The Supreme Court has simply eschewed
entering such a sensitive area. In Sincock, however, the order to pay costs (including legal
fees) would not have been directed at the state treasurer; the defendants individually or
representatively would have been liable. If liable individually, the defendants might be
reimbursed under state law, as in California or New York. See note 89 supra. This would
be a matter of internal state policy which would not affect a federal court's power to
award costs. If liable representatively, the defendants would pay costs only out of funds
171
172
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from awarding successful plaintiffs the costs and fees incident to a
judgment for specific relief. By enjoining the Delaware officials as
individuals and yet simultaneously refusing to recognize them as such
for purposes of taxing the costs of the litigation that made the injunction possible, Sincock assumed a contradictory stance. The better view
77
is that which flows logically from Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota:
once the state or'its official is a proper litigant in the federal courts,
each is subject to injunction and any costs or legal fees incident
78
thereto.
B.

Fees in State Courts
Many states permit judicial review of administrative actions in
their courts under the unconstitutional and ultra vires exceptions,
partly because of the influence of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act which embodies both concepts. 179 The Revised Model
State Act, adopted in several states, 80 goes further in clearly providing
for review of any "violation of constitutional or statutory provisions."' 8 1
These statutes allow private actions against state administrators on
principles analogous to those developed in the federal courts. The question of whether state officials may be taxed for the costs of the main
action is one of state law. If costs are taxable against such officials, and
no direct prohibition against awards of attorney or expert witness
fees exists in the state statute governing costs, then the equitable doctrines discussed above are applicable.
authorized by the state for use in their official capacities. Again, the state itself would not
be compelled to pay the costs. See note 149 supra.
177 275 U.S. 70 (1927); see note 165 and accompanying text supra.
178 In Amos v. Sims, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (reapportionment case
where costs and legal fees taxed against state officials), the court stated:
Individuals who, as officers of a state, are clothed with some duty with regard
to a law of the state which contravenes the Constitution of the United States,
may be restrained by injunction, and in such a case the state has no power to
impart to its officers any immunity from such injunction or from its consequences,
including the court costs incident thereto.
See also notes 108-11 and accompanying text supra.

179 The original Model State Act authorized the reviewing court to set aside agency
action which was, inter alia, "in violation of constitutional provisions" or "in excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency." See MODEL STATE AmimnsrATIVE PROcEDURE Aar §§ 12(7)(a), (b) (1946).
Some states still preserve this or similar language in their administrative procedure
statutes. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 255(g)(l)-(2) (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143315(1)-(2) (1964); ORLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 322(1)(a)-(b) (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.20
(1)(a)-(b) (1957).
180 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § SA-120(h) (Supp. 1972); HAWsAI Rxv. STAT. § 91-14(g)
(1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-4(g) (1971).
181 REVISED MODEL STATE ADxnrNIs9mATivE PROCEDURE Acr § 15(g)(1) (1961).
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CONCLUSION

Environmental concern is widespread. Congress, state legislatures,
and courts are keenly aware of the paramount importance of protecting
our environment. The equitable exceptions favoring court-awarded
legal fees continue to be exceptional; not all environmental cases
should be considered exceptional as a matter of law. However, because
effective environmental protection laws are still developing, these
equitable exceptions provide an essential supplement to the statutory
fee provisions in encouraging responsible citizens to undertake publicinterest environmental litigation.
Archie T. Wright III

